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Imagine a world in which it is not expert 
knowledge but an opinion market on 
Twitter that determines whether a newly 
emergent strain of  [avian] flu is really 
contagious to humans.
Lewandowsky et al. (2017, p. 1).
The advent of  social media has changed the way 
information is created, disseminated, and consumed, 
leading to heated debates about the extent to 
which social media is promoting the formation of  
“echo chambers” or homogeneous and polarized 
online communities (Barberá et al., 2015; Bessi 
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et al., 2016; Del Vicario et al., 2016; Del Vicario 
et al., 2017; Zollo et al., 2017; but see Bakshy et al., 
2015; Eady et al., 2019). Conspiracy theories, 
often defined as allegations that powerful people 
and organizations are covertly plotting to achieve 
sinister goals (Douglas et al., 2019; Moscovici, 
1987; van der Linden et al., 2020), find fertile 
ground within polarized online environments 
(Del Vicario et al., 2016) and a growing climate of  
misinformation and science denial (Lewandowsky 
& Oberauer, 2016; Rutjens et al., 2018; Washburn 
& Skitka, 2017). Although most popular conspir-
acy theories stretch the limits of  credulity and are 
mathematically untenable (Grimes, 2016), they are 
endorsed by enough people to no longer be 
treated as the “implausible visions of  a lunatic 
fringe” (Melley, 2000, p. vii; van der Linden, 2013). 
For example, over 50% of  Americans endorse at 
least one conspiracy theory (Oliver & Wood, 
2014), and a recent YouGov poll finds that about 
28% of  the U.S. population (and 50% of  Fox 
News viewers) believe that Bill Gates is responsi-
ble for the COVID-19 pandemic so that he can 
inject people with location-tracking microchips 
via mandatory vaccination (Sanders, 2020).
Existing research has mostly explored the psy-
chological correlates of  conspiratorial thinking 
(e.g., Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994; 
Swami et al., 2011; van der Linden et al., 2020; 
van Prooijen et al., 2015), or how exposure to 
conspiracy theories affects (anti)social beliefs and 
behavior (van der Linden, 2015; see Douglas 
et al., 2019, for an extensive review). In fact, sur-
vey-based studies examining individual differ-
ences in conspiracy ideation represent the vast 
majority of  social psychological research on the 
topic (Wood & Douglas, 2013). Although a grow-
ing literature has focused on the role that con-
spiracies play in online networks (Bode & Vraga, 
2017; Del Vicario et al., 2016; Lewandowsky 
et al., 2015), the intergroup nature of  conspira-
cies and the ways in which groups express lan-
guage online remain severely understudied 
(Douglas & Sutton, 2018; Zollo et al., 2015). This 
is important because analyzing online language 
can yield new insights into how conspiracy theo-
rists communicate (Douglas et al., 2019), as well 
as the extent to which language reinforces online 
echo chambers (Bessi et al., 2016). Thus far, rela-
tively few studies have attempted to analyze the 
psycholinguistic features of  online conspiratorial 
content. For example, Wood and Douglas (2013) 
analyzed the argument structure of  comments 
made on 9/11 blogs categorizing them either as 
conspiratorial or in favor of  conventional expla-
nations for the events. Lewandowsky et al. (2015) 
analyzed comments in the climate change blogo-
sphere in response to their research on the psy-
chology of  conspiracy theories, and found that 
the comments themselves exhibited strong ele-
ments of  conspiratorial thinking. Perhaps more 
directly relevant to the current research, Klein 
et al. (2019) investigated the “linguistic” precur-
sors to involvement in Reddit’s conspiracy theory 
forum, and found that themes around power, ter-
rorism, deception, and government played an 
important role compared to matched controls 
(see also Samory & Mitra, 2018). Other research 
has compared language use of  active pro- and 
antivaccination users on Twitter, noting conspira-
torial themes around fraud and government, as 
well as significantly higher ingroup language 
amongst users with long-term antivaccination 
attitudes (Mitra et al., 2016). We expand on this 
burgeoning line of  research by evaluating the lan-
guage used by actual and prominent conspiracy 
theorists and their followers on Twitter—regard-
less of  topic domain—and whether conspiracy 
theorists, as a group, use defining linguistic fea-
tures to communicate their beliefs and ideas in 
comparison to science advocates.
Specifically, we advance the literature by com-
paring the language of  two groups of  Twitter 
“influencers” and their respective followers. By 
“influencers” we mean prominent individuals 
that have the ability to affect the opinions and 
behaviors of  their followers due to their per-
ceived authority, knowledge, or position (Burt, 
1999; Freberg et al., 2011; Turcotte et al., 2015; 
Watts & Dodds, 2007). Following prior research 
on online language use (Klein et al., 2019; Wood 
& Douglas, 2013), we utilize a case-control design 
and look at language use by contrasting two 
groups or online communities.
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Specifically, we adopt a well-established para-
digm by Bessi et al. (2015) that contrasts conspira-
torial against scientific narratives on social media. 
This contrast is of  particular theoretical interest 
(and has been adopted in many previous studies on 
social media dynamics) primarily because conspir-
acy and science groups form highly segregated and 
polarized online communities that advance distinct 
narratives which are at odds with one another. 
However, at the same time, research has shown that 
the manner in which information is consumed and 
disseminated within each online community is 
nonetheless very similar, so the groups are well-
matched on these characteristics (see Bessi et al., 
2015; Del Vicario et al., 2016; Del Vicario et al., 
2017; Samory & Mitra, 2018; Zollo et al., 2017; 
Zollo & Quattrociocchi, 2018). For example, ana-
lyzing over 3,000,000 Facebook comments, Bessi 
(2016) finds that users who primarily polarize in 
either conspiratorial or science-based feeds are 
actually similarly low on common personality traits 
such as agreeableness and conscientiousness. The 
intergroup conflict arises out of  the fact that whilst 
science influencers tend to diffuse factual and sci-
entific knowledge, conspiracy groups disseminate 
unverified, controversial information usually aimed 
at refuting or questioning the mainstream scientific 
elite and official narrative (Bessi, 2016). Scientists 
are therefore a frequent target of  conspiracy theo-
ries, from conspiracies about climate science 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2015) and COVID-19 
(Roozenbeek et al., 2020), to vaccination and genet-
ically modified organisms (GMOs; Rutjens et al., 
2021). Popular scientists often publicly refute con-
spiracy theories and, in turn, conspiratorial narra-
tives frequently inspire online harassment, attacks, 
and cyberbullying of  outspoken scientists (Deutsch 
& Wheaton, 2020; Lewandowsky, Mann, et al., 
2013) who are viewed as part of  the conspiracy 
(Franks et al., 2017). Importantly, however, whilst 
the narratives are clearly conflicting, both groups 
do hold broadly similar goals, namely to diffuse 
knowledge and ways of  thinking that are deemed to 
be of  value to their respective audiences. Although 
prior research has extensively looked at the diffu-
sion dynamics of  content posted in conspiracy ver-
sus science groups on social media, it has not yet 
evaluated differences in how prominent conspiracy 
theorists and their followers express themselves 
online.
Building on this paradigm, this approach will 
therefore provide insight into (a) intergroup dif-
ferences in psycholinguistic patterns among those 
who subscribe or are exposed to conspiratorial 
content and (b) the extent to which language used 
by influencers is shared by their followers. 
Ultimately, identifying stable intergroup differ-
ences in language use will inform a growing body 
of  research exploring the psychological charac-
teristics of  “conspiracist worldviews” (Wood & 
Douglas, 2015) and the wider proliferation of  
misinformation and “alternative facts” in an 
increasingly online world. We analyze conspirato-
rial language through the Linguistic Inquiry and 
Word Count (LIWC) 2015 software, which 
includes several extensively validated dictionaries 
that allow researchers to make inferences about 
individuals’ psychological states (Pennebaker 
et al., 2001; Pennebaker et al., 2015).  As Tausczik 
and Pennebaker (2010) write, “The words we use 
in daily life reflect who we are and the social rela-
tionships we are in” (p. 25). There are strong 
theoretical reasons to suspect linguistic patterns 
in the expression of  online conspiratorial conver-
sations, as conspiracy theories fulfill basic psy-
chological needs (Douglas et al., 2017). 
Specifically, we draw on psychological themes 
outlined in the LIWC dictionary that are particu-
larly relevant to conspiracy ideation, namely: 
ingroup versus outgroup language (e.g., we, us, vs. 
they, them); cognition (e.g., cause, know); nega-
tive emotions such as anger (e.g., hate) and anxi-
ety (e.g., nervous, afraid); and several themes 
related to popular conspiracy theories such as 
narratives that revolve around power (e.g., supe-
rior), death (e.g., bury, kill), and religion (e.g., 
church, mosque). Although computational analy-
ses of  online language are often done in an 
exploratory manner (e.g., see Klein et al., 2019; 
Mitra et al., 2016), given the rich literature on the 
psychology of  conspiracy theories, we offer 
directional hypotheses about whether the focal 
groups of  interest (conspiracy theorists and their 
followers) are expected to be higher or lower on 
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the relevant LIWC themes when contrasted to 
their case-control referent category (popular sci-
entists). We did not have specific hypotheses 
about differences between influencers and fol-
lowers, so these contrasts are exploratory. We dis-
cuss the relevance of  each psychological theme in 
further detail below.
Ingroup Versus Outgroup
Research suggests that ingroup identification—
specifically, the desire to belong to and maintain 
a positive image of  the ingroup—plays a central 
role in conspiracy ideation (Douglas et al., 2017). 
In the context of  conspiracy theories, the 
ingroup is classified as the believers in the con-
spiracy, whereas the outgroup consists of  those 
who carry out the conspiracy (Mashuri & 
Zaduqisti, 2015). According to van Prooijen and 
van Lange (2014), conspiracy thinkers typically 
feel oppressed by a collective enemy or powerful 
outgroup, whom they accuse of  secret conspir-
acy formation (see also Kofta & Sedek, 2005). In 
other words, the ingroup attributes nefarious 
collective intentions to the outgroup, framing 
them as a dangerous and deceitful enemy (Kofta 
et al., 2011). A prominent historical example of  
this is the negative portrayal of  the Jewish peo-
ple leading up to World War II and the rise of  
Nazi ideology. For example, in a 1941 essay, 
Joseph Goebbels, Reich Minister of  Propaganda, 
writes, “Due to their birth and race, all Jews 
belong to an international conspiracy against 
National Socialist Germany. They wish for its 
defeat and annihilation and do everything in 
their power to bring it about” (Goebbels, 1943). 
This language is emblematic of  conspiracy idea-
tion, uniting the ingroup in their enmity toward 
a common outgroup, creating an “us vs. them” 
mentality (Douglas & Sutton, 2018). Although 
little empirical research exists on the frequency 
of  ingroup versus outgroup language on social 
media in the context of  conspiracy theories spe-
cifically, “most conspiracy beliefs can be framed 
in terms of  beliefs about how a powerful and 
evil outgroup [emphasis added] meets in secret, 
designing a plot that is harmful to one’s ingroup” 
(van Prooijen & van Lange, 2014, pp. 238–239). 
Accordingly, we expect that conspiracy influenc-
ers and their followers use language that is 
focused more on the outgroup (as compared to 
popular scientists).
Cognitive Processes
Conspiracy theories also offer a reprieve from the 
pervasive uncertainty of  world events by simplify-
ing complex problems (van der Linden, 2013). 
This makes them especially attractive to individu-
als low in tolerance for uncertainty and high in 
need for cognitive closure. Need for cognitive clo-
sure, which refers to individuals’ desire for defi-
nite knowledge on an issue, has been posited to 
foster conspiratorial thinking when conspiratorial 
explanations are temporarily salient (Kruglanski & 
Webster, 1996; Marchlewska et al., 2017). Further 
research suggests that people who lack control 
may also be more susceptible to conspiracy beliefs 
due to their inclination to perceive a coherent and 
meaningful interrelationship among a set of  ran-
dom or unrelated stimuli (Whitson & Galinsky, 
2008).
Part of  the allure of  conspiracies is that they pro-
vide causal explanations for distressing events which 
may in reality be coincidental and are otherwise dif-
ficult to understand and make sense of  (Hofstadter, 
1966; van Prooijen et al., 2018). A contemporary 
example is the notion that the coronavirus was inten-
tionally bioengineered rather than the product of  a 
random accident, an account which helps restore a 
sense of  predictability, agency, and control (van 
Prooijen & Acker, 2015). Although relevant evidence 
from social media studies remains relatively scant, 
Mitra et al. (2016) found significantly higher cer-
tainty-oriented language among antivaccination (as 
compared to provaccination) audiences on Twitter; 
and Samory and Mitra (2018) also found expressions 
of  increased certainty on the r/conspiracy forum 
following dramatic events such as the Boston bomb-
ing (compared to weeks before). Accordingly, we 
hypothesize that conspiracy-focused accounts are 
marked by language that is higher in need for cer-
tainty, causal explanations, and past orientation (i.e., 
finding explanations for past events).
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Negative Emotions
Belief  in conspiracy theories is strongly rooted in 
negative affect (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018) 
and, in many cases, conspiracies gain influence by 
eliciting negative emotions such as fear and anxi-
ety. A prominent example in the United States was 
the red scare spurred by Joseph McCarthy in the 
decade following World War II. Marked by fear of  
a threat to American political values by the Soviet 
Union, McCarthyism painted Communists as a 
dangerous “other,” constructing a culture of  fear 
(Skoll & Korstanje, 2013). Uncertain emotions 
such as worry and fear may activate a need to 
restore order and structure through conspiratorial 
and paranormal thinking (Whitson et al., 2015). 
Another example of  this phenomenon is the alt-
right’s reliance on conspiratorial fearmongering 
about the secret and nefarious agenda of  other 
races and religions (see StormFront, 2008). 
Indeed, research reveals an association between 
anxiety and conspiratorial thinking about other 
ethnic groups, such as Jews and Arabs (Grzesiak-
Feldman, 2013). These emotions can be func-
tional (van Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018) such that 
fear can help people avoid the suspected conspir-
acy, whereas anger and aggression can motivate 
people (online) to actively confront the conspiracy 
(e.g., “u stupid sheeple need 2 wake up lol”; see 
Wood & Douglas, 2013, p. 4). The role of  nega-
tive emotion in online conspiratorial discourse has 
been documented in several prior studies (e.g., 
Klein et al., 2019), particularly anger (Mitra et al., 
2016). We therefore expect tweets from conspir-
acy influencers and their followers to be higher in 
negative emotion, particularly anger and anxiety.
Power, Death, and Religion
Lastly, many conspiracy theories heavily feature 
narratives that play into themes surrounding 
power, death, and religion. For example, conspir-
acy theorists frequently accuse powerful elites 
(e.g., Bill Gates) as well as globalist organizations 
such as the United Nations of  conspiring in 
secret to create a “New World Order” (Stewart, 
2002). In line with this, research finds that feel-
ings of  powerlessness can increase endorsement 
of  conspiracy theories (Douglas et al., 2019; 
Uscinski & Parent, 2014). In addition, many con-
spiracy theories follow the “mysterious” circum-
stances of  the death of  prominent individuals 
and celebrities, such as the conspiracy that 
Princess Diana was murdered, that John F. 
Kennedy was assassinated by the CIA, or that 
rapper Tupac Shakur faked his own death 
(Douglas & Sutton, 2008; McCauley & Jacques, 
1979; Quinn, 2002). Finally, historically, religion 
and science are viewed as distinct narratives that 
are at odds with one another, and this tension has 
become an important aspect of  the increasing 
politicization of  contemporary science 
(Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017; Rutjens et al., 
2018). Conspiracy theories in particular are often 
described as quasireligious worldviews (Wood & 
Douglas, 2018) in the sense that they frequently 
ascribe “supernormal agency to the conspirators” 
(Franks et al., 2013, p. 9). The few prior social 
media studies that have been conducted have all 
found an increased focus on such themes when 
analyzing conspiratorial content online (Klein 
et al., 2019; Mitra et al., 2016; Samory & Mitra, 
2018). Thus, we hypothesize that tweets from 
conspiracy theorists feature more words relating 
to themes of  death, power, and religion.
Methods
Procedure and Sampling Strategy
Influencers and followers. In deciding what key influ-
encers to look at, we referred to objective indica-
tors of popularity (i.e., the highest number of 
followers) of vocal UK/US-based conspiracy 
theorists and science communicators who are 
active on Twitter, resulting in a final list of five 
prominent individuals for each group (see Table 
S1 in the supplemental material). As part of our 
institutional ethics approval (PRE.17/24), the 
identities of these 10 influencers were anonymized. 
Tweets were also collected from the timelines of a 
nonoverlapping sample of followers for each 
group. We followed the guidelines from Murphy 
(2017) for conducting psychological research on 
Twitter using R and the Twitter Application Pro-
gramming Interface (API) to (a) obtain a sample 
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of tweets from the timelines of these 10 influenc-
ers, and (b) to obtain tweets from a random sam-
ple of followers from the two groups of interest. 
Tweets were collected over a span of 5 days from 
July 21, 2017 to July 25, 2017. The Twitter API 
allows both developers and researchers to use 
HTTP requests to query a limited part of Twitter’s 
database. To obtain the necessary Twitter data we 
relied on the open-source programming software 
R version 3.5.0 (R Core Team, 2020), along with 
the “rtweets” and “twtools” packages as detailed 
in Kearney (2017), as well as the API. The final 
sample, after deleting duplicate tweets, consisted 
of the then most recent 16,290 (8,112 conspiracy, 
8,178 science) tweets from the timelines of 10 
influencers, and 160,949 tweets (85,071 conspir-
acy, 75,878 science) from 1,656 unique follower 
accounts (875 conspiracy, 781 science).
Language use. A comparison of  language use 
between the tweets of  these two groups was 
accomplished with the Linguistic Inquiry and 
Word Count (LIWC) tool (Pennebaker et al., 
2001). For a given text input, the LIWC returns 
output lists of  percentages of  words falling into 
each category (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010; 
Pennebaker et al., 2015). Concretely, based on the 
reviewed literature, we looked at the following 
categories: negative emotions (e.g., anger, anxi-
ety); ingroup–outgroup language; cognitive pro-
cesses (e.g., certainty, causation); time orientation; 
and specific themes related to conspiracy theories 
such as language around power, death, and 
religion.
Influencer timeline. In order to collect a sample of  
tweets from the timeline of  each of  the 10 public 
figures, we used the “get_timeline” function in 
the “rtweet” package to obtain up to 2,000 tweets 
per account. This could have resulted in 10,000 
possible tweets per group, though in reality the 
number was lower as some individuals are less 
active on Twitter than others. The “clean_tweets” 
feature was then used to clean up the data and 
remove retweets, and the final sample consisted 
of  the most recent 16,290 tweets from the time-
line of  influencers from the two groups. These 
tweets were then analyzed using LIWC, which 
returned a table of  percentage scores for the rel-
evant linguistic and psychological categories.
Follower timeline. Collecting the tweets from a sam-
ple of  followers from each group was done using 
the “collect_follower_timelines” function in the 
“twtools” package, which allowed us to specify the 
number of  tweets to return from the timelines of  
accounts that followed the 10 influencers. Due to 
built-in rate limits in the Twitter API, tweets were 
collected over a period of  5 days. Retweets were 
excluded using the “clean_tweets” feature, and 
accounts following both conspiracy and science 
influencers were identified and removed using the 
“duplicated” function in R to ensure independence 
of  observations, resulting in a final dataset of  
160,949 tweets from 1,656 Twitter IDs.1 The 
means of  every Twitter ID’s LIWC category value 
were obtained using the R “data.table” package, 
resulting in 1,656 sets of  values.
Results
For purely descriptive purposes, we visualized 
the social network of  our science and conspir-
acy followers. Because this is computationally 
challenging, we provide a snapshot of  about 
0.5% of  the entire network of  the 10 top con-
spiracy theorists and scientists on Twitter (see 
Figure 1). The visualization suggests that sci-
ence and conspiracy followers form their own 
fairly homogeneous online communities and 
may thus also rely on distinctive linguistic 
patterns.
We also visualize the most commonly used 
nouns and adjectives by the top 10 conspiracy and 
science influencers in a word cloud (see Figure 2). 
There are clear descriptive differences between 
influencer groups, whereas scientists focus on sci-
ence and topics such as “people,” “time,” “future,” 
“space,” “world,” “good,” and “earth,” conspiracy 
theorists focus on “followers,” “trailer” (of  con-
spiracy movies), “Trump,” “Infowars,” “Russia,” 
“UFOs,” and “report.”
Turning to the specific LIWC categories, 
following Mitra et al. (2016) and Klein et al. 
(2019), we present results comparing the 
groups using Bonferroni (p < .01) 
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and unequal-variance adjusted pairwise com-
parisons given the nonnormal nature of  the 
data. In addition, we reran all analyses using the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum (Mann–
Whitney U) test; all results presented here 
remained significant (see Table S3 in the sup-
plemental material).
Negative Emotions
An independent-samples t test was conducted to 
compare the LIWC values for words related to 
negative emotion, anxiety, and anger between 
conspiracy and science influencers. Results (see 
Figure 3 Panel A) indicated a significant difference 
in LIWC values for negative emotion (e.g., “fuck,” 
“shit,” “attack,” “terror”), with conspiracy influ-
encers scoring significantly higher (M = 2.86, SD 
= 5.92) than science influencers (M = 1.47, SD = 
4.35), t(14889) = 17.07, p < .001, Mdiff  = 1.39, 
95% CI [1.23, 1.55], d = 0.28. Conspiracy influ-
encers also scored significantly higher (M = 1.28, 
SD = 3.75) in anger word use (e.g., “damn,” 
“hell,” “hate”), compared to science influencers 
(M = 0.41, SD = 2.56), t(14299) = 17.27, p < 
Figure 1. Snapshot of the Twittersphere of our top 
10 conspiracy and science influencers.
Note. We visualize 0.5% (n = 87,918) of all followers of the 
10 conspiracy and science influencer accounts within the 
Twittersphere (n = 8,615,814) at the time of data collec-
tion. Red indicates conspiracy followers, blue indicates 
science followers, and yellow represents overlap (users who 
follow both groups, excluded for analyses). The larger nodes 
represent the top five science and conspiracy influencers on 
Twitter. Top popular scientists have many more followers 
(e.g., 8,000,000) than the top conspiracy influencers (e.g., 
666,000), so their relative size is larger within the network. 
The network was visualized using the Fruchterman–Reingold 
force-directed layout algorithm in R.
Figure 2. Word cloud for our top 10 conspiracy and science influencers.
Note. Word cloud visualizing the most commonly used nouns and adjectives for the top 10 conspiracy and science influencers. 
Bigger and bolder representation indicates that the words appeared more frequently in the source text.
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.001, Mdiff  = 0.87, 95% CI [0.77, 0.97], d = 0.29, 
and the same was observed for anxiety scores 
(e.g., “fear,” “threat,” “horror”) among conspira-
cists (M = 0.46, SD = 2.17) and scientists (M = 
0.20, SD = 1.29), t(13175) = 9.49, p < .001, Mdiff  
= 0.27, 95% CI [0.21, 0.32], d = 0.17.
Follower data was user-averaged. Extending our 
analysis to the follower groups (see Figure 3 Panel 
B), results also indicate a significant difference in 
LIWC values for negative emotions between the 
conspiracy (M = 3.13, SD = 2.33) and science 
groups (M = 2.37, SD = 1.92), t(1552) = 7.16, p < 
.001, Mdiff  = 0.77, 95% CI [0.56, 0.98], d = 0.36. In 
particular, conspiracy followers (M = 1.44, SD = 
1.49) scored significantly higher in LIWC values for 
anger compared to science followers (M = 0.92, 
SD = 1.15), t(1522) = 7.89, p < .001, Mdiff  = 0.53, 
95% CI [0.39, 0.66], d = 0.40. In contrast, there 
were no significant differences in LIWC values for 
anxiety between conspiracy (M = 0.27, SD = 0.38) 
and science followers’ tweets (M = 0.25, SD = 
0.36), t(1576) = 0.78, p = 0.43, Mdiff  = 0.015, 95% 
CI [−0.02, 0.05], d = 0.04.
Cognitive Processes
LIWC scores for cognitive processes were lower 
for conspiracy (M = 6.31, SD = 8.54) compared 
to science influencer timelines (M = 9.93, SD = 
10.96), t(15425) = −23.52, p < .001, Mdiff  = 
−3.62, 95% CI [−3.92, −3.32], d = −0.38. 
However, there were no significant differences 
(see Figure 4 Panel A) in LIWC values for past-
oriented language (e.g., “was,” “been,” “had”) 
between conspiracy (M = 2.33, SD = 4.32) and 
science influencer timelines (M = 2.21, SD = 
4.79), t(16142) = 1.71, p = .09, Mdiff  = 0.12, 95% 
CI [−0.02, 0.26], d = 0.03.2 Unexpectedly, con-
spiracy influencer scores were lower (rather than 
higher) for certainty (e.g., “truth,” “all,” “must”; 
M = 0.86, SD = 2.98) compared to those of  sci-
ence influencers (M = 1.66, SD = 5.36), t(12828) 
= −11.82, p < .001, Mdiff  = −0.80, 95% CI 
[−0.94, −0.67], d = −0.21. Similarly, contrary to 
our hypothesis, there were no significant differ-
ences in causality (e.g., “how,” “why,” “because”) 
between conspiracy (M = 1.27, SD = 3.76) and 
science influencers (M = 1.34, SD = 3.34), 
t(16038) = −1.25, p = .21, Mdiff  = −0.07, 95% 
CI [−0.18, 0.04], d = −0.02.
We subsequently analyzed user-averaged fol-
lower data (see Figure 4 Panel B). In contrast to the 
influencer data, LIWC values for past-oriented lan-
guage were significantly higher for conspiracy (M 
= 2.39, SD = 1.35) compared to science followers 
(M = 2.15, SD = 1.35), t(1654) = 3.65, p < .001, 
Figure 3. Mean differences in negative emotion between the conspiracy and science groups.
Note. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Mdiff  = 0.24, 95% CI [0.11, 0.37], d = 0.18. 
Conspiracy LIWC values for certainty (M = 1.76, 
SD = 1.79) were also significantly higher than 
those of  science followers (M = 1.42, SD = 1.07), 
t(1452) = 4.76, p < .0001, Mdiff  = 0.34, 95% CI 
[0.20, 0.48], d = 0.25. Lastly, although causality 
scores (M = 1.36, SD = 0.97) were descriptively 
higher for conspiracy than for science followers 
(M = 1.28, SD = 0.91), this difference was not 
statistically significant, t(1654) = 1.73, p = .08, 
Mdiff  = 0.08, 95% CI [−0.01, 0.17], d = 0.09.
Outgroup Language
In contrast to our hypotheses, no significant differ-
ences in LIWC values for outgroup language (e.g., 
“they,” “them”) were found between conspiracy (M 
= 0.42, SD = 1.96) and science influencers (M = 
0.44, SD = 2.0), t(16288) = 0.33, p = .90, Mdiff  = 
−0.03, 95% CI [−0.09, 0.03], d = −0.02.3 However, 
an analysis of  the user-averaged follower timelines 
indicated that LIWC values for outgroup language 
were indeed significantly higher among conspiracy 
followers (M = 0.52, SD = 0.58) when compared 
to science followers (M = 0.37, SD = 0.57), t(1638) 
= 5.19, p < .001, Mdiff  = 0.15, 95% CI [0.09, 0.20], 
d = 0.26. There were no significant differences for 
ingroup language (e.g., “us,” “we,” “our”) between 
conspiracy (M = 0.72, SD = 1.15) and science fol-
lowers (M = 0.64, SD = 0.73), t(1654) = 1.61, p = 
.11, Mdiff  = 0.08, 95% CI [−0.02, 0.17], d = 0.08.
Power, Death, and Religion
Lastly, given the strong tendency of  conspiracy 
theories to focus on themes related to power, 
death, and religion, we evaluated intergroup dif-
ferences in use of  these words (see Figure 5 Panel 
A). The LIWC values for words related to power 
(e.g., “president,” “government,” “military”) were 
significantly and substantially higher for conspir-
acy influencers (M = 4.79, SD = 6.71) compared 
to science influencers (M = 2.45, SD = 5.41), 
t(15533) = 24.47, p < .001, Mdiff  = 2.34, 95% CI 
[2.15, 2.53], d = 0.39. Values for words related to 
death (e.g., “dead,” “war,” “killed”) were also sig-
nificantly higher for conspiracy (M = 0.52, 
SD = 2.26) than for science influencers (M = 0.15, 
SD = 1.20), t(12336) = 12.99, p < .001, Mdiff  = 
0.37, 95% CI [0.31, 0.42], d = 0.23. Lastly, LIWC 
values for language relating to religion (e.g., 
“God,” “Jesus,” “Muslim”) were higher for con-
spiracy influencers (M = 0.37, SD = 2.13) com-
pared to science influencers (M = 0.22, SD = 1.92), 
Figure 4. Mean differences in cognitive processes between the conspiracy and science groups.
Note. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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t(16083) = 4.67, p < .001, Mdiff  = 0.15, 95% CI 
[0.09, 0.21], d = 0.07.
Analyzing follower tweets, we found a  signifi-
cant difference in LIWC scores for power 
between conspiracy (M = 2.91, SD = 1.98) and 
science follower groups (M = 2.46, SD = 1.65), 
t(1645) = 5.07, p < .001, Mdiff  = 0.45, 95% CI 
[0.28, 0.63], d = 0.25 (see Figure 5, Panel B). A 
significant difference was also found for language 
related to death between conspiracy (M = 0.38, 
SD = 0.96) and science followers (M = 0.20, SD 
= 0.33), t(1096) = 5.18, p < .001, Mdiff  = 0.18, 
95% CI [0.11, 0.25], d = 0.31. Significant differ-
ences were also found in LIWC values for words 
relating to religion, with conspiracy followers 
scoring higher (M = 0.81, SD = 1.44) than sci-
ence followers (M = 0.49, SD = 1.02), t(1571) = 
5.26, p < .001, Mdiff  = 0.32, 95% CI [0.20, 0.44], 
d = 0.27.
As a robustness check, we estimated a logistic 
regression model predicting group membership 
(1 = conspiracy, 0 = science) for both influencers 
and followers based on the relevant LIWC lan-
guage variables (see Table 1). Results replicate our 
findings: negative emotions, particularly the 
expression of  anger, are predictive of  member-
ship for both influencers (OR = 1.13) and 
followers (OR = 1.44). The effects of  cognitive 
processes such as causality, certainty, and past ori-
entation were fairly small and in the expected 
direction for followers but not influencers (as 
before). Outgroup language had a strong effect 
amongst followers (OR = 1.50). Similarly, lan-
guage surrounding religion, power, and death was 
strongly predictive of  membership for both con-
spiracy influencers and their followers, with death-
related language revealing the largest association 
(OR = 1.15 and OR = 2.45, respectively).
Discussion
A recent review identified a number of  key gaps in 
the psychological literature on conspiracy theories, 
including a heavy reliance on self-report surveys 
from convenience or student populations. The 
authors argue that “big data” from social media 
analyses could greatly improve ecological validity as,
[T]hey allow researchers to directly observe 
the unfolding and sharing of  conspiracy 
theories in real time and in real life, rather than 
through the medium of  self-report surveys 
and laboratory simulations . . . and [these 
technologies] allow access to large numbers of  
Figure 5. Mean differences in power and death themes between conspiracy and science groups.
Note. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
616 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 24(4)
conspiracy believers who can be very hard to 
reach for survey and experimental studies. 
(Douglas et al., 2019, p. 22)
We advance the literature by providing exactly 
such evidence from a large sample of  tweets 
from popular conspiracy influencers and their 
followers on Twitter.4
Specifically, we hypothesized that different 
psycholinguistic patterns would emerge within 
the context of  a polarized intergroup paradigm 
(Bessi et al., 2015). In line with our expectations, 
results indicate significant and stable intergroup 
differences in linguistic patterns between tweets 
from prominent conspiracy and science influenc-
ers and a nonoverlapping set of  their followers. 
In particular, the use of  negative emotions, espe-
cially anger, was significantly and substantially 
higher among both conspiracy influencers (d = 
0.29) and their followers (d = 0.40) as compared 
to science audiences. This finding is consistent 
with the observation that “belief  in conspiracy 
theories is strongly rooted in negative emotions” 
(van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018, p. 902; see also 
Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009),5 and echoes find-
ings from prior social media research using 
Facebook and Reddit data which also found that 
conspiratorial content carries more overall nega-
tive sentiment (Klein et al., 2019; Zollo et al., 
2015), particularly around anger (Mitra et al., 
2016) and following dramatic events (Samory & 
Mitra, 2018). The influencer–follower pattern 
also complements other recent findings that 
moral emotions such as anger and outrage can aid 
the diffusion of  online content (Brady et al., 
2017; Crockett, 2017).
Somewhat surprisingly, the findings around 
cognitive processes such as causality, certainty, 
and past orientation were more mixed. An osten-
sibly counterintuitive finding is that conspiracy 
influencers actually scored lower on certainty 
than science influencers. This was not the case 
for their followers, however, who scored higher 
on both certainty (d = 0.18) and past orientation 
(d = 0.25), which is in line with the more tradi-
tional observation that need for cognitive closure 
(a desire for certainty) correlates positively with 
belief  in conspiracy theories (Douglas et al., 2019; 
Marchlewska et al., 2017). One potential explana-
tion for these diverging findings is the nature of  
the referent group: scientists may themselves 
communicate in causal language or convey cer-
tainty through scientific consensus (van der 
Linden et al., 2019). Notably, related research has 
Table 1. Logistic regression predicting group membership based on LIWC categories.
Group membership (DV) Influencer Follower
Independent variables OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Negative emotion 1.06*** [1.06, 1.07] 1.22*** [1.15, 1.28]
Anxiety 1.10*** [1.08, 1.12] 1.16 [0.90, 1.50]
Anger 1.13*** [1.11, 1.14] 1.44*** [1.32, 1.57]
Past orientation 1.01 [0.99, 1.01] 1.14*** [1.06, 1.23]
Certainty 0.94*** [0.93, 0.95] 1.22*** [1.12, 1.32]
Causal 0.99*** [0.99, 1.00] 1.09 [0.99, 1.22]
Outgroup 1.01 [0.99, 1.02] 1.50*** [1.30, 1.73]
Ingroup 0.77*** [0.75, 0.78] 1.01 [0.94, 1.09]
Religion 1.04*** [1.02, 1.06] 1.33*** [1.19, 1.49]
Power 1.08*** [1.07, 1.09] 1.16*** [1.09, 1.23]
Death 1.15*** [1.13, 1.18] 2.45*** [1.82, 3.39]
Note. Odds ratios (OR) represent coefficients from separate regressions. Group membership (1 = conspiracy, 0 = science). 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) variables were scored such that they represent the percentage of total words used 
in the language sample.
***p < .001.
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also offered mixed findings, with certainty (but 
not causal language) sometimes being higher 
among conspiracy theorists (Mitra et al., 2016) 
whilst at other times pointing to patterns of  
increasing certainty as well as doubt (Samory & 
Mitra, 2018).
The ingroup versus outgroup analysis also 
revealed partial support for our hypotheses. 
Although there was no marked increase in out-
group-oriented language among conspiracy influ-
encers, this pattern did clearly emerge for their 
followers, consistent with the notion that con-
spiracy theories often embrace an “us versus 
them” mentality (Douglas & Sutton, 2018) and a 
general sense of  mistrust, paranoia, and hostility 
towards the powerful “other” (Goertzel, 1994; 
Swami et al., 2010; van der Linden et al., 2020). 
Along with the topology of  the network, these 
findings may serve as indirect evidence for two 
highly segregated online communities forming 
distinct science and conspiracy echo chambers 
(Bessi et al., 2016; Zollo et al., 2017).6
We observed some of  the largest and most 
consistent differences between science and con-
spiracy influencer and follower groups for lan-
guage categories that are particularly relevant to 
conspiracy theories, such as themes relating to 
power, religion, and death (d = 0.25 to d = 0.39). 
Many popular conspiracies involve death-related 
themes (e.g., Holocaust denial, the Sandy Hook 
conspiracy), and these findings are in line with a 
large literature which details that conspiracy theo-
ries are strongly preoccupied with the death of  
prominent individuals (e.g., JFK, Princess Diana, 
Osama Bin Laden) as part of  a secret plot in which 
powerful actors are conspiring (Stewart, 2002; 
Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009; Swami et al., 2010; 
Wood et al., 2012). Based on an analysis of  letters 
to The New York Times from 1897 to 2010, Uscinski 
and Parent (2014) note that perceived power asym-
metries within the context of  international and 
domestic conflict (e.g., elections, war) can help 
explain the popularity of  conspiracy theories. 
Although our data were collected prior to the cor-
onavirus outbreak, pandemics certainly fall into 
this category where, once again, powerful elites 
(e.g., Bill Gates) or ethnic and religious outgroups 
(e.g., Jews) are blamed for the death of  thousands 
(Spring, 2020; Cook et al., 2020). Looking at some 
of  the language themes specifically in our sample, 
there is a focus on “war,” “terror,” and “attacks” 
(with relevant named “entities” such as ISIS, 
Russia, US, Syria, and Israel) within these catego-
ries for conspiracy accounts. Although the litera-
ture on this remains limited, this finding is 
surprisingly consistent with other recent research. 
For example, both Klein et al. (2019) and Mitra 
et al. (2016) found—in different contexts—rela-
tively strong language effects for terrorism, power, 
war, death, and religion.
Although our findings add to the psychologi-
cal underpinnings of  conspiracist worldviews 
(Wood & Douglas, 2015), and to the emerging 
field of  computational psycholinguistics (Sterling 
et al., 2020; Sylwester & Purver, 2015; Yaden 
et al., 2018), our research is not without limita-
tions. First, while examining tweets from the top 
influential conspiracy and science influencers 
(and their online following) ensures greater eco-
logical validity (Douglas et al., 2019), we cannot 
make causal inferences based on these data. We 
adopted a case-control study design and acknowl-
edge that although we were specifically interested 
in language differences between conspiracy and 
science influencers, it is possible that inclusion 
of  a different control group could bear on the 
nature of  our results. Having said this, it is 
encouraging that despite having used different 
controls, several studies still converge on similar 
findings such as the strong role of  negative emo-
tion and themes surrounding death, power, and 
religion in online conspiratorial discourse. Of  
course, inconsistent findings, for example around 
group and cognitive processes, could still be due 
to methodological or contextual differences 
between studies. For example, although the short 
Twitter character limit restricted richer analyses 
of  natural language, future research may want to 
use supervised machine learning methods (e.g., 
dynamic topic models) to study more complex 
language features in longer blogs (e.g., see Klein 
et al., 2019).
Second, while we have taken steps to ensure 
that the Twitter accounts placed into the two 
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mutually exclusive categories did not follow indi-
viduals from both conspiracy and science profiles, 
it is not possible to guarantee that they do not fol-
low or have been exposed to other conspiracy and 
science outlets. A third limitation is that, while we 
examined data from followers, following a science 
or conspiracy outlet does not necessarily equate to 
belief. Rather, what we are examining is how 
exposure to content correlates with language use, 
and how this, in turn, may relate to psychological 
characteristics. Although this limitation prevents 
us from making any causal statements regarding 
actual conspiracy beliefs and how they spread 
from influencers to followers, it does not prevent 
us from comparing naturalistic language use in a 
large dataset of  over 160,000 tweets. Fourth, we 
note that these Twitter data were gathered during 
the Trump era (as evident by the fact that “Trump” 
is one of  the most frequently used words in the 
sample) and may therefore have limited generaliz-
ability. Fifth, it could be argued that some findings 
may be idiosyncratic to the set of  influencers we 
have selected. However, the influencers them-
selves were selected based on an objective metric, 
namely, having the largest Twitter following at the 
time of  data collection. Furthermore, a compari-
son of  the base rate frequencies of  the LIWC cat-
egories in our Twitter sample with the LIWC2015 
Twitter reference database, based on millions of  
observations, reveals that our sample falls well 
within the norm (see Table S2 in the supplemental 
material). Having said this, it is important to note 
that conspiracy influencers generally have fewer 
followers, and the accounts were not balanced on 
gender, ethnicity, or other potential criteria which 
in and of  themselves have shown to correlate with 
language use (Newman et al., 2008).
Finally, while many of  the statistically signifi-
cant differences in language use reflect small to 
medium effect sizes, the frequency of  influencer 
activity, along with the repeated sharing of  viral 
content that is a feature of  online echo chambers 
and social media in general, means that even small 
effects can have cumulative impact (Funder & 
Ozer, 2019). Previous studies have pointed to the 
sociocognitive potency of  even brief  exposure to 
conspiratorial content, such as reduced social and 
civic engagement, and a greater likelihood of  
engaging in a motivated rejection of  science 
(Jolley & Douglas, 2014; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & 
Oberauer, 2013; Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2016; 
van der Linden, 2015). Thus, the increasing spread 
and adoption of  conspiracy theories call for solu-
tions to effectively counter them (Sunstein & 
Vermeule, 2009). An increasing line of  research 
has shown that people can be “inoculated” against 
(online) conspiratorial content by preemptively 
warning and exposing them to weakened doses of  
the arguments and techniques that are used by 
conspiracy theorists (Banas & Miller, 2013; Basol 
et al., 2020; Jolly & Douglas, 2017; Roozenbeek 
et al., 2020; Roozenbeek & van der Linden, 2019). 
We hope that our findings can help further eluci-
date ways to detect, counter, and eradicate the 
spread of  harmful conspiracy theories.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the language of  a large 
corpus of  tweets from the top conspiracy and sci-
ence influencers and their followers on Twitter. 
We found that there exist stable intergroup differ-
ences in language use that correlate with exposure 
to and engagement with conspiratorial content. 
Our results indicate that the language used by 
conspiracy influencers as well as their followers on 
Twitter is more likely to be characterized by nega-
tive emotions such as anger. In addition, we found 
that conspiracy influencers and their followers use 
language related to power, death, and religion 
more than their science-focused counterparts. 
Among conspiracy followers, there is also a greater 
focus on certainty, past orientation, and outgroup 
language, which reinforces the notion that demand 
for conspiracies is fueled by a search for certainty 
and an “us versus them” mentality. With some 
exceptions, recipients of  conspiracies appear to 
propagate content (e.g., anger) in a similar man-
ner, which may contribute to or reinforce online 
polarization.
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Notes
1. A total of  n = 321 (16.2%) out of  the 1,977 total 
accounts collected were identified as duplicates and 
removed, along with an associated 9,978 tweets.
2. We note that the Wilcoxon rank sum test did 
reveal a significant difference in past-focused lan-
guage for conspiracy influencers (z = 3.10, p < 
.01) albeit with a very small effect size (r = .02).
3. We note that the Wilcoxon rank sum test did 
reveal a significant difference in outgroup lan-
guage for conspiracy influencers (z = 5.44, p < 
.01) albeit with a very small effect size (r = .04).
4. For example, some prominent conspiracy theo-
rists in our sample have been banned from Twitter, 
so these analyses constitute a unique opportunity 
to study how natural language is expressed online.
5. We acknowledge that some scholars have 
observed differences between dictionary-based 
sentiment and self-reported emotions (Beasley & 
Mason, 2015), though it is worth noting that rel-
evant LIWC categories highly correlate (r = .91) 
with other linguistic dictionaries such as Empath 
(Klein et al., 2019).
6. Although it is worth noting that in the context 
of  antivaccination, others have noted a height-
ened ingroup language focus (e.g., see Mitra et al., 
2016). We also necessarily excluded people who 
followed both groups (16% of  the sample) to pre-
serve independence for the analyses, so that might 
have inflated the level of  observed homophily.
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